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This report is a compilation of the significant findings of the most exhaustive study of 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) conducted to date. Of particular note is 
that the report examines IMET and its benefits - over the long term - as viewed by various IMET 
actors. For a number of reasons, the benefits ofiMET are not realized immediately upon the 
completion of any course but rather are realized over time. Thus an assessment conducted 
immediately upon completion of an IMET program is not a sufficient measure of its impact. The 
report is also unique in that it blends and integrates both quantitative and qualitative perceived 
benefits ofiMET. The report documents the assessment of the IMET program. as seen through a 
360 degree lens: from the perspective ofiMET graduates, their subordinates, their leaders, in-
country Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) responsible for the in-country decision making 
related to IMET, Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) charged with routine administrative 
management and implementation ofiMET in-country, and IMET policy makers (Congress, DoS, 
DSCA, OSD). 
The report takes a discrete focus, i.e. IMET within the context of graduate education. 
Resource constraints (i.e . funding and time) made it impracticable to conduct a more 
comprehensive assessment addressing all education and training obtained through the IMET 
program. However, we believe that the report is particularly useful, in that while it addresses 
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IMET within the context of graduate education, many of the findings have relevance and 
application to other aspects of IMET, e.g. technical training, as well as to the IMET program as a 
whole. 
In order to avoid any misunderstandings at the onset, the researchers wish to point out 
that the report does not propose any legislative or substantive change to the current objectives of 
IMET; these objectives, as updated through interviews with key actors in Washington, D.C, 
seem appropriate as they are currently formulated. Rather, it offers observations and perceptions 
that may shape and influence current policy and its implementation. 
The assessment project was conducted in seventeen (17) selected countries throughout 
the security assistance network. Details on the selection process are contained in the Scope and 
Methodology section of this report. It is worth noting, however, that the researchers found that 
the perceptions and experiences of IMET graduates transcended national boundaries. These 
common themes can be seen in both the quantitative and qualitative findings sections of this 
report. 
Lastly, it is our intent that the report be used to understand "IMET in action" i.e. how 
IMET is utilized and perceived by a variety of key actors. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The research for this report was funded and supported by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and was conducted in seventeen (17) countries between January 
and December 2007. The original proposal for this project was made by CCMR and funding 
provided to complete the project. 
The research included review of primary and secondary documents, interviews with 
policy- makers and administrators, SAOs and FSNs in country, a written survey instrument 
administered to FSNs at the 2007 annual Training Program Management Reviews (TPMRs) 
and by e-mail, and a separate survey instrument administered by the Center for Civil- Military 
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Relations (CCMR) research team to graduates ofiMET programs in 16 countries . The emphasis 
in the survey of graduates was on those who had completed Masters degree programs. Virtually 
all evidence in support ofiMET in the past has been anecdotal. The current research project 
sought to combine as many different methodologies as possible in order to obtain as objective an 
assessment as possible of the impact of IMET on graduate education, within the constraints of 
assessing one program of many situated in very complex social and economic realities. The 
authors utilized both their background in social science research and their familiarity with the 
nature and dynamics ofiMET, in an effort to achieve as deep and accurate an assessment as 
possible. 
The overall findings of the research demonstrate that the impact of IMET on graduate 
education, as perceived by the graduates themselves and others involved in the program, are 
consistent with the main goals of IMET as currently understood. The contemporary goals of 
IMET are: 
• encouraging effective, positive defense relationships 
• promoting interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces 
• exposing foreign civilian and military officials to democratic values, positive civil -
military relations, military professionalism, and international norms of human rights. 
• building partner institutional capacity 
In all cases, the findings are extremely positive. The findings from the analysis of the 
quantitative data are supported by nine findings from the qualitative data. The findings include: 
• 94% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat 
increased their knowledge within their specialty. 
• 88% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat 
increased their knowledge outside of their specialty. 
• 95% of respondents reported increased knowledge of U.S . systems and practices. 
The final key question producing quantifiable results relates to the first legislative 
objective of the IMET program: to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and 
www.ccmr.org 6 
increased understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries. The question, to which 
respondents could select yes or no, providing additional explanation as necessary, was : 
• As a result of your IMET [experience], did your views and perceptions of the U.S. 
change? 
As reported by the survey respondents, IMET does have a substantial impact on views and 
perceptions by foreign officers and civilians of the U.S. 
• 84% of respondents reported that their views and perceptions of the U.S. did change; 
while 16% reported no change in their views and perceptions of the U.S. 
And, in examining the open- ended answers, virtually all of this knowledge was positive 
in the sense that they better understood the reality, vs. the fiction, of American society and 
government. 
As assessed by the IMET graduates, IMET greatly impacts program participants. 
According to the results of this survey, IMET has also very positively influenced IMET 
participants' units . The units constitute recent IMET graduates' main sphere of influence and 
action. As demonstrated in the data, the impact of IMET identified by IMET graduates tends to 
decline as the unit of measure broadens beyond the individual IMET participant. As IMET 
graduates progress in their careers, it is likely that their impact and !MET's impact on ministry of 
defense (MOD) and country will increase along with their own responsibilities and spheres of 
influence. 
The qualitative data also demonstrates very positive assessments . The most notable of 
these are the following: 
• IMET improves interoperability. 
• IMET course attendance is linked to promotion and career advancement. 
• IMET has a cross fertilization, pollination effect. Once they return to their units, IMET 
graduates use what they have learned and also teach what they have learned to their 
colleagues, producing a multiplying effect 
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• IMET exposes participants to US teaching methodology which emphasizes analysis and 
problem-solving. 
• IMET improves management and decision making of participants, thereby increasing 
their military's effectiveness. 
• IMET exposes participants to the importance and benefits of civilian control of the 
military and a strong civil-military relationship at the institutional level. 
• Many IMET participants supported their country's participation in US-led or other 
international operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan and in some cases identified the 
causal factors to specifically include IMET. 
• IMET helps to improve English skills. English language skills are critical to successful 
communication in theater (combat operations, peace support operations, exercises, etc.) 
• IMET promotes improved understanding of U.S. values and culture. 
• IMET promotes building partner institutional capacity. 
Based upon the research, the authors set forth seven recommendations which they believe 
will improve and increase the positive impact of !MET. These are as follows: 
• Increase the IMET budget to at least the $100 million (in year 2000 constant dollars) 
envisaged by SECSTATE Powell, but never quite reached. Improve Continuity, 
Timeliness and Predictability of IMET Funding. 
• Streamline Human Rights Vetting Procedures. 
• Clarify Eligibility for !MET-Funded Education and Training. 
• Improve Efforts to Maintain Contact with Graduates post-IMET. 
• Institutionalize Exchange Between Foreign and U.S. Students . 
• Develop a Systematic, Periodic and Comprehensive Means of Program Evaluation. 
Our overall findings are that IMET is a very worthwhile investment to achieve U.S . goals 
in support of positive trends, and the recommendations seek to enhance the investment and 
further increase the impact of this valuable program. 
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PROJECT BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
In 2007, the DSCA provided funding to the Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) 
to conduct an assessment to identify and assess the benefits of the IMET program. Since the 
inception of the IMET program, no formal assessment of IMET and graduate educational 
offerings had been conducted. 
At a fundamental level, the assessment asks the following question "What is your view of 
the IMET program- in terms of purpose and benefit?" This question (along with sub sets of the 
main question) was examined through the various lenses of the actors noted below. 
In order to ensure a meaningful and rigorous assessment, the CCMR team developed a 
methodology which combined quantitative and qualitative assessment tools. Several segments of 
the IMET population were targeted for data collection. Those segments included: 
• Senior policy and decision makers within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Department of State, and the U.S. Senate 
• Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) within selected IMET recipient countries 
• Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) within selected IMET recipient countries 
• Senior military and civilian leadership within Ministries of Defense and Armed Forces 
within selected IMET benefiting countries 
• Graduates of IMET programs, with emphasis on graduate level education 
We conducted this assessment from January 2007 through December 2007. We planned 
and performed the assessment by developing and utilizing formal assessment tools. In 
conducting this assessment, we also balanced affordability of the project with the need to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on the assessment objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions. 
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PROJECT SCOPE AND METHDOLOGY 
Based on the complementary mixture of the team's expertise in the area of performance 
assessment and evaluation, 14 years of experience in conducting graduate level education 
programs supported by IMET, and background in social science research, the team targeted 
selected countries based upon the following criteria: 1) those having a significant IMET budget; 
2) those targeted for mobile education and training teams (METs and MTTs) during CY 2007. 
Note that the second criterion satisfied the need to complete the project within CY 2007 and 
within the funding limitations. 
Our background research included a review of the legislative history ofiMET, existing 
legislative goals, and Department of State (DoS) and DSCA policies as interpreted by high -
level officials with responsibilities for the IMET program. At the onset, our goal was to 
understand the basis of IMET and the background and perceptions of senior policy makers. Our 
research was also enhanced by one-on-one interviews with SAOs and FSNs in selected countries. 
This technique enabled the assessment team to marry national level policy objectives with the 
practical in-country application of those objectives. Additionally, we examined strategic and 
selected other planning documents of various IMET recipient countries to understand links 
between IMET and national level strategic goals. 
We developed two quantitative personal data "survey" instruments, which are found in 
the Appendix to this report. The first instrument gathered data from the FSNs who help 
implement IMET at the national level. We selected this IMET stakeholder group for inclusion in 
the assessment project due to their corporate knowledge. Some of them have been in their 
positions for thirty years. We gathered this data through contacts established at 2007 Training 
Program Management Reviews (TPMRs) as well as via a web-based survey. The advantages of 
these methodologies were rapid response and collection of data at minimal cost. The second 
instrument was used to collect data from IMET graduates. Both of these instruments contained 
sets of questions with an emphasis on attitudinal objects. Rating scales included nominal and 
ordinal scales. For the nominal scale, we used a Likert scale closed ended question methodology 
that allowed respondents to indicate how closely their perceptions/beliefs matched a question or 
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statement on the rating scale (i.e. rank on a scale of 1 to 5). We also used nominal scales for 
questions that required responses of no ordering (i.e. yes/no) . Multiple choice questions 
permitted the assessment team to profile respondents (e.g. rank, years in service, age at time of 
IMET selection). 
We also gathered qualitative data. Brief explanations were solicited in both of the survey 
instruments depending on the selected response (e.g. "if no, briefly explain"). Focus groups 
consisting of IMET graduates were formed in many of the countries visited. The focus group 
members completed the quantitative survey and also had open, but structured, dialogue with the 
researcher. Qualitative data was also gathered from senior stakeholders. The assessment team 
used a structured open ended interviewing technique. This methodology allowed interviewees 
to answer questions in their own words. This methodology provided rich and expressive 
observations, disclosure of experiences, perceptions and "story telling". Interviewing also 
enabled the assessment team to observe behavior, i.e. non-verbal expressions. The team believes 
that the resulting data far exceeds the credibility and soundness of the anecdotes about IMET that 
existed prior to the completion of this project. 
In summary, input was collected using the following combination of quantitative and 
qualitative instruments: 
• Written and online survey ofFSNs 
• Written survey of IMET graduates 
• Meetings and interviews with IMET graduates 
• Meetings and interviews with senior level host country MoD and Armed Forces staff 
• Meetings and interviews with military- SAO - and civilian U.S. Government (USG) 
personnel - FSN 
Countries that participated in this assessment project are: Colombia, Czech Republic, El 
Salvador, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Philippines, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. In addition, the assessment 
team used the opportunity of conducting CCMR programs to gather further qualitative data from 
several additional countries for this assessment project. 
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IMET LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Background to Foreign Assistance 
This brief section on IMET legislative history is included to provide the context within 
which a relatively small foreign aid program, IMET, can be better understood. Foreign aid has 
long been seen as a critical tool in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The foreign aid 
program is huge, and complex, and IMET is a small, but we believe, critical part. For the 
amount of money committed to the program, less than $100 million, the impact appears to be 
impressive. In 2005, the United States provided approximately $21 billion of foreign assistance 
to roughly 150 nations around the globe. In that same year IMET was $89 million. Foreign aid 
currently represents approximately 0.18% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) . While this 
percentage is an increase over the late 1990s and early part of the new millennium, when the 
average hovered around 0 .16%, it is significantly less than historical highs seen in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. Foreign assistance fell steadily during the decades following the post-war 
period, although major foreign policy initiatives like the Alliance for Progress in 1961 led to 
some temporary increases. In 2000 approximately $10 billion in official development assistance 
(ODA) was disbursed, while in 2005 this figure had jumped to $27.5 billion. While the $27.5 
billion disbursed in 2005 included $8.5 billion of supplementary (and temporary) funding to 
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the total foreign assistance budget excluding Iraq 
remains slightly higher than the historic lows of the 1990s. 1 
Types of Foreign Assistance 
Today, most foreign assistance is appropriated by Congress through the annual Foreign 
Operations appropriations bill. No single central agency or organization exists to oversee and 
coordinate all U.S . aid. Aid is distributed by multiple federal agencies and departments, and runs 
the gamut from economic development assistance to democracy promotion, military assistance, 
health programs, and food aid. 
1 Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy. CRS Report 
for Congress, updated January 19,2005 : 17, 33 . Accessed December 20,2007. Available through the CRS web. 
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Foreign aid is divided into five major categories by the Congressional Research Service: 
bilateral development aid, military aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and 
security goals, humanitarian aid, and assistance provided through multilateral organizations? 
1. In the 2005 fiscal year (FY05), bilateral development aid represented the largest of 
these categories: $7.35 billion dollars, accounting for 34.7% of all Congressional appropriations 
to U.S. aid programs. Bilateral development aid is provided by the U.S. to a foreign country 
through U.S. administered programs which tend to focus on intermediate to long-term goals for 
the countries in which they are implemented. This type of assistance is largely managed by the 
U.S . Agency for International Development (USAID), and programs focus on a wide range of 
issues, from democracy promotion, HIV/AIDS and other health projects, and environmental 
protection to economic reform and development of the private sector. 
2. The second largest category in FY05 was military assistance, which represented 
23 .6% of U.S . aid contributions. In FY05, Congress appropriated $5 billion for military 
assistance, the bulk of which ($4.75 billion) went towards the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
grant program. FMF funds are provided to U.S. allied and friendly nations and are used by these 
nations to purchase U.S . equipment and training, including weapons systems. Most FMF funds 
go to two nations: Egypt and Israel. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program accounted for $89 million in FY05 . Finally, support for non-U.N. peacekeeping 
operations ($178 million in FY05) is also included in this category. 
3. Economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals was the third largest 
category ofFY05 appropriations, representing 21.8% of the total aid budget. $4.62 billion 
dollars were appropriated to programs in this category with the primary aim of addressing 
particular economic, political or security concerns of the U.S. More than half of the aid provided 
in this category flows through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which directs funds towards 
development projects, cash transfers, or other projects intended to help nations stabilize their 
economies and repay principal and interest on their foreign debts . Funds have been heavily 
2 Tarnoff, Curt and Nowels, Larry. CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U. S 
Programs and Policy. Updated January 19, 2005. Retrieved through the CRS web, page i. 
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allocated towards nations in the Middle East to support peace efforts in the region, and in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 911 1, there has also been a special focus on countries which 
are considered strategically important in counter-terrorism efforts. This type of assistance has 
also been concentrated in countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe 
since the fall of the USSR. Finally, counter-narcotics efforts in the Andean nations, crime and 
weapons proliferation programs also fall under this category of assistance. 
4. Humanitarian aid and multilateral assistance represent the remainder of the aid 
appropriations for that year, respectively comprising 12.6% and 7.3% of the total. 3 $2 .68 billion 
was allocated to humanitarian aid projects in FY05 , the bulk of which flowed through three 
programs focusing largely on emergency or crisis response: the refugee program, disaster relief, 
and food assistance programs. 
5. An additional $1.54 billion was appropriated to multilateral assistance. Aid in this 
category flows from the U.S . to international organizations like the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) or to multilateral development banks like the World Bank and focuses on a 
wide range of interest areas . 
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND THE IMET PROGRAM 
Security assistance and cooperation includes the provision of grant, loan and credit 
funding to be used for equipment, weapons and other military articles, education and training, 
and other support by the U. S. to allied and friendly foreign governments in order to assist these 
nations in strengthening their military capacity. The authorization of cash sales of weapons 
systems and other military equipment is also included in this category. Security assistance is 
designed to support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Guidance comes from 
U.S. military strategic plans and objectives and is based upon policies and guidance issued by 
both DoS and the DoD. 
3 Ibid, 5. 
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Security assistance is widely viewed by U.S. officials and officers as an important way 
for the U.S. to obtain access to and influence militaries in allied and friendly nations, as well as 
to promote interoperability between the U.S. and recipient countries' armed forces. As General 
Bantz J. Craddock, Commander of the United States European Command, stated in testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee on March 15, 2007, "Key among U.S. Combatant 
Commands ' Security Cooperation tools are programs which provide access and influence, help 
build professional, capable militaries in allied and partner nations, and promote interoperability." 
U.S. security assistance encompasses programs that are overseen by DoS and 
implemented by the DoD I DSCA, as well as programs that are authorized and funded directly 
through the DoD. DoS provide policy guidance and supervision for many security assistance 
programs through the office of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security. The DoS is responsible for determining what security assistance programs will be 
made available to a country, as well as the scope and content of these programs. DoS also 
administer the foreign aid budget. 
Within DoD, security assistance is managed by the DSCA. DSCA was established as an 
agency of the Department of Defense in October 2000 by DoD Directive 5015.65 . (DSCA was 
DSAA previously.) 4 According to this directive, DSCA has the responsibility to "direct, 
administer, and provide overall policy guidance for the execution of security cooperation and 
additional DoD programs in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended 
and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended . . . and this Directive."5 In addition to 
providing oversight and guidance on the formulation and execution of security assistance 
programs, DSCA is to maintain liaison with Congress regarding legislation impacting sec~rity 
cooperation, conduct negotiations with foreign countries regarding weapons and equipment 
sales, and oversee the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), which 
provides professional education to personnel involved in U.S. security assistance programs. 
4 DoD Directive 5105 .65 "Defense Security Cooperation Agency;" October 31, 2000; available from 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/51 0565p.pdf; accessed January 21 , 2008. 
5 Ibid, 2. 
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DoD considers security assistance to be a subset of its broader efforts at security 
cooperation. According to DSCA, security cooperation encompasses activities conducted with 
U.S. allies and friendly nations to: 
• Build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests 
• Build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations 
• Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access 6 
DoD policy regarding security assistance was codified in March 1981 by DoD Directive 
5132.3, which recognizes the importance of security assistance as an instrument of national 
security policy, and affirms its status as an "integral element of the DoD mission." 7 According 
to the Directive, the design and implementation of DoD executed security assistance programs 
shall take into consideration the economic capabilities of recipient countries as well as any aid 
provided by other nations. The Directive goes on to state that "except for overriding military 
considerations, the build up of military forces that the recipient country ultimately cannot support 
shall be discouraged." 8 
Key security assistance related concerns of DoD as outlined in this Directive include 
rationalization, standardization and interoperability with allies, and the protection of technology 
related to advanced U.S. weapons systems. 
The IMET Program 
The International Military Education and Training Program was established by the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The 
program was originally designed with two purposes: 
(1) to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased 
understanding between the United States and foreign countries in 
furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; and 
6 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "What is Security Cooperation?" DSCA website, available from : 
http: //www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/fag .htm; accessed January 28, 2008. 
7 DoD Directive 5132.3 , "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance," March 10, 1981 ; 
available from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513203p.pdf; accessed January 21 , 2008, page 2. 
8 Ibid, 2. 
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(2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their 
resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by 
them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby 
contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries. 
In 1978, the program's scope was expanded to include the following third objective: 
(3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in 
such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human 
rights. 9 
DSCA interprets !MET's objectives as: 
• To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial 
military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense 
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries; and 
• To increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb 
and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human 
rights. 10 
The second major legislative change that was made to IMET since its inception came in 
1991, in the aftermath of the Cold War, with the introduction of the Expanded IMET Program. 
Expanded IMET 
..., I 
In 1991, in recognition of the transformation in the global security environment as a 
result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Congress expanded the IMET 
program to include a component commonly known as the Expanded IMET Program (E-IMET). 
The E-IMET Program was introduced as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act by the FY 
1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. . Congress earmarked $1 Mil of the 1991 IMET 
budget (Approx $42 Mil) to be used for education and training that met the E-IMET objectives. 
9 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, Sec. 543. 
10 DSCA website: http://www.dsca.mil/home/intemational military education training.htm; accessed February 2, 
2008. 
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In the early years (1991-2000) DSCA used as a policy guide that a country ' s IMET program 
needed to contain approximately 30% ofE-IMET certified courses The objectives of theE-
IMET program are as follows: 
• Responsible Defense Resource Management 
o Managing and administering military establishments and budgets 
o Focus on intensive, professional-level training in management of defense 
ministries, armed forces and budgets 
• Improved Military Justice Systems and Procedures In Accordance with Internationally 
Recognized Human Rights 
o Creating, implementing and maintaining effective military judicial systems and 
military codes of conduct, with a special emphasis on the protection of 
internationally recognized human rights 
• Fostering Greater Respect for and Understanding of the Principle of Civilian Control of 
the Military 11 
Courses in combat or technical skills may not be funded under the E-IMET program. An 
additional innovation introduced with this legislation was the expansion of civilian eligibility for 
pursuit of education and training. While initially participation in education or training funded by 
the IMET program was limited to military personnel or civilian employees of the Ministry of 
Defense, with this expanded mandate education and training opportunities were opened to 
civilians working in other ministries as well as in nongovernmental organizations, with the aim 
of improving communication and understanding between military and non-military actors in 
. . . 12 
recipient countnes. 
The E-IMET program continues today and is an integral part of the IMET program. 
11 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Memorandum for the Training Community: Updated Guidance for Use in 
Developing and Reviewing the Eligibility of Courses I Programs for Addition to the Expanded International Military 
Education and Training (E-IMET) Program (DSCA 02-24)," July 10, 2002. 
12 Ronald H. Reynolds, "Is Expanded International Military Education and Training Reaching the Right Audience?" 
The DISAM Journal, Spring 2003 . Available from: 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/J ournal%20lndex/ Journals/ Journal Index/v .25 3/Reynolds, %20Ronald%20H., %2 
ODr.pdf; accessed February 11, 2008, 94. 
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Informational I Field Studies Program 
Finally, an additional component of the IMET program is the Informational Program, 
now known as the Field Studies Program (FSP). Many students who attend education or training 
offered under the IMET program may also participate in FSP activities. The FSP aims "to 
ensure that international students return to their homelands with an understanding of the 
responsibilities of governments, militaries, and citizens to protect, preserve, and respect the 
rights of every individual." 13 FSP activities are intended to provide IMET participants with an 
awareness and understanding of democratic ideals and concepts like respect for human rights, the 
role of a free press, the importance of political, economic, and social pluralism, representative 
government, civilian and military justice systems, democratic political processes, respect for 
ethnic and other minorities, public and social welfare, labor and labor management relations, 
environmental protection, transparency and the rule of law, educational opportunities, and other 
concepts in a similar vein. 
Management and Use of Funds Provided Under the IMET Program 
The IMET program is managed in-country by the U.S. Embassy, most frequently in an 
Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), Office ofMilitary Cooperation (OMC), Military 
Assistance Program (MAP) or a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). The ODC is 
headed by a uniformed member of the U.S. military, and in most cases one or more FSNs also 
staff the office. The size of the ODC staff varies greatly from country to country, depending 
upon a wide range of factors including U.S. strategic interests in the country or the region and 
budgetary constraints. The researchers observed that the size of the ODC staff is not always 
proportional to the size of the IMET budget which must be executed. 
IMET funds may be used to send students to education or training programs in the United 
States, in- country, or to regional programs. The majority ofiMET program participants are 
13 Deparhnent of the Army, "Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) Manual," (Army 
Regulation 12-15, draft copy 06/18/07 ; available from: 
http: //www .disam.dsca.miVitm/FUN CTION AL/JSCET%20Final%20Draft%20 18%201 un%2007 .pdf; accessed 
February 11, 2008, page 221-222. 
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foreign military officers, enlisted personnel or civilian employees of the recipient country ' s 
Ministry of Defense or other related ministries . However, according to the relevant legislation as 
amended, legislators and other individuals may also participate in !MET-funded education and 
training if their participation would "contribute to responsible defense resource management, 
foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, 
contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to 
counter-narcotics law enforcement efforts, or improve military justice systems and procedures in 
accordance with internationally recognized human rights ." 14 
A variety of education and training options are offered through the IMET program. 
IMET participants may pursue education or training at a large number of military schools or 
institutions in the United States, in - country, and in regional programs. Many foreign officers 
attend Professional Military Education (PME) designed to prepare military officers for 
leadership in their careers at one of the senior or intermediate U. S. command and staff colleges 
or war colleges. Participation in the command and war colleges is by invitation only, with each 
branch of the military determining which countries will receive invitations to these colleges. 15 
Instruction is also offered in a wide range of subjects through shorter courses, including 
programs in aviation, diving, defense resource management, logistics, medical, democratic 
defense decision-making, civilian control of the military and intelligence services, the 
development of military legal systems and many other topics . 
Graduate education, the specific focus of this report, is also supported by IMET. For 
purposes of this report, the a sessment focused on not only degree programs but short "executive 
education" level courses. Specifically, by agreement of the main policy implementers contacted 
for this research, graduate education means for purposes of this research the degree programs 
offered at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Various units at NPS 
also deliver short courses in residence and abroad. As opportunities presented themselves for the 
researchers to interview graduates of other US graduate degree programs, the researchers did so. 
However, due to difficulties of comparing very different events with a standardized survey 
14 Ibid, Sec. 541. 
15 DSCA website: http://www.dsca.mil/home/professional military education.htm; accessed February 2, 2008. 
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instrument, only qualitative data (not quantitative data) derived from those short events will be 
utilized in this report. 
Technical training is also available, including maintenance training and technical courses 
designed to build skills to operate or maintain military equipment or weapons systems, or to 
carry out duties within a particular military specialty. 16 English language training is another 
major use of IMET funds . 
IMET is also frequently used to bring Mobile Education Teams (METs) or Mobile I 
Military Training Teams (MTTs) to foreign countries to train larger numbers of students at one 
time. While one of the goals of the IMET program is to familiarize foreign officers with U.S. 
values, customs and culture, some countries prefer to use their IMET budgets to fund METs or 
MTTs instead. The MET can be a cost-effective way to train many students at once. For 
example, the country may be able to train more than 50 students at once, the cost of bringing 
three or four instructors to their country, rather than paying to cover the tuition, travel and per 
diem expenses for all 50 students to travel to the U.S., which would be considerably more 
expensive. Then too, some countries require that their officers doing courses abroad receive per 
diem equal to diplomatic personnel. These expenses can be very high indeed. 
Some IMET recipient nations have cost-sharing agreements with the U.S. government, 
under which the host country may cover the travel and living allowance for students traveling to 
the U.S. for education or training, while the IMET funds are used to cover the course tuition and 
fees. Countries which receive IMET funding also qualify for reduced tuition rate when spending 
their own country funds through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Additionally, some 
countries have been allocated a small token amount of IMET (perhaps $20,000), in order to 
allow them to qualify for this reduced FMS rate on other education and training requirements. 
The IMET budget has expanded in recent years, especially since the terrorist attacks on 
the U.S. on September 11 rh, 2001, but has yet to reach $100 million; in the overall context of 
security assistance the IMET program is very small. In FY 2000, the IMET budget was $50 
16 DSCA website: http://www.dsca.mil/home/technical training.htm; accessed February 2, 2008. 
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million. In FY07, the total IMET budget was approximately $86 million, and this amount was 
distributed among 134 countries, providing training for nearly 8,000 students. 17 18 The program 
budget has remained in the neighborhood of $80 - $90 million annually since FY03. 19 
PERSPECTIVES FROM WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Between 9 and 12 March 2007, a member of the CCMR research team, Thomas Bruneau, 
conducted interviews in Washington, DC at the main agencies dealing with IMET. The purpose 
of these interviews was to obtain the most recent view of the status and value of IMET in order 
to most effectively design the surveys and determine where to conduct the study. The team had 
previously reviewed documents and statements from DoS and DSCA, and compiled a list of 
what appeared to be the three main goals or dimensions of IMET. Dr. Bruneau reviewed these 
three in addition to seeking the agreement of the policy stakeholders on limiting the study to 
graduate education as provided at NPS. The findings of these interviews are reported in the 
following section. 
Department of State 
At the Department of State, the Office of Plans, Policy & Analysis in the Bureau of 
Political- Military Affairs, brief meetings were conducted with the Director, Kevin O'Keefe, 
and more extensively with Nicole Porreca, Security Assistance Program Analyst. Ms. Porreca 
has been in this position for a year and a half; she is responsible for the Foreign Military Training 
Report, and she attends all of the TPMRs. They were joined by Amy Coletta, of the same office. 
They agreed that the goals or objectives ofiMET are the same as in the past, and as 
stated in the draft prepared by the CCMR research team. However, they characterized IMET, in 
terms that are even more current including counter terrorism and Iraq. Upon returning to the 
17 Bloomfield, Lincoln P. "Education and Training: A Common Foundation for Security," eJournal USA : 
Foreign Policy Agenda; Volume 9, Number 3 November 2004. Available from: 
http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itps/1104/ijpe/ijpell04.htm; accessed January 10, 2008. 
18 DISAM, Introduction to Security Cooperation Management; available from: 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/Research!Presentations/2%20introsc.ppt#321 , 1 ,Introduction to Security Cooperation 
Management; accessed February 2, 2008. 
19 Ibid. 
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meeting, Kevin 0 'Keefe, put the value of IMET in terms of the most important of the three 
stated goals, which is future cooperation in which the mil -to -mil contacts can be extremely 
valuable. He stated that they have to argue the value of IMET in terms that are "intuitive" using 
largely anecdotal evidence. They all said that IMET has great support. Now IMET is at a 
budget of $86M and they expect in 09 it will be $90 M; however they thought, given the value 
they attribute to IMET, that it should be in the range of $100 - $120 M. 
They raised a very important issue, which was the "cutting off' of all security assistance, 
including IMET, due to the ASPA sanctions. These sanctions applied to the period ofFY 04, 05, 
and 06. They noted that the ASP A sanctions were being removed by two initiatives; waivers 
from the president and wording in foreign operations' appropriations; the number of countries 
that will receive IMET will grow by the 21 or 22 that had stopped receiving it. The removal of 
the American Servicemember's Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions applies to IMET and FMF. 
The interviewees were asked about priority countries, i.e. how the DoS select the 120 
countries or so that receive these funds- referencing the Security Assistance Guidance. They 
made clear that the Guidance is a DoD document and not a DoS document. Rather, since with 
IMET there are a number of countries, and not all that much money, and many different 
programs, their idea is to achieve broad coverage and no specific focus; in general terms "a bit of 
this and a bit of that." Amy Coletta said that with SECSTA TE Rice and her Transformational 
Development Initiative, (Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy CRS 
RL34141.) the focus is supposed to be strategic, but this doesn ' t apply to IMET. Some of the 
rules of thumb they observe are as follows : 1) most of the allocations are based on previous 
years' allocations; 2) countries do not "grow out" of IMET; a small amount can have a big 
impact; and it is generally "good things to do" with emphasis on highly subjective criteria. They 
emphasized that DoS is very much involved in the allocations. They further emphasized that 
with the end of year funds they work closely with DSCA to allocate those to priorities. Nicole 
Porreca plays an active role at the SCETWGs (which are the current name of what were formerly 
the TPMRs). The SCETWGs are important since these events are the closest approximation of 
meetings between the consumers, producers, and those responsible for policy. They consider 
that the key link is DoS with DSCA (Kay Judkins in particular) as implementers. They noted 
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that with SECSTATE Rice they are expected to do assessments. (Restructuring U.S. Foreign 
Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance in Transformational Development CRS 
RL33491) So, they are keenly interested in the IMET assessment project, in how it is done, in 
the tools, and in the results. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Additional meetings were then conducted at the Pentagon, specifi cally within the 
Partnership Strategy division I branch of ISA, and more specifically to the International Capacity 
Building office. Participants in these meetings were the Director, Michael J. McNerney, COL 
Gregory Hermsmeyer, Chief, International Education Integration, and Jennifer M Taylor, a 
contractor working on several projects for that office. 
In view of the title of the office, Michael McNerney would add to the three IMET 
objectives, (IMET is more or less managed in his office) that of building institutional capacity. 
This office is responsible for GPOI, Warsaw Initiative, 1206, and the regional centers. 
They raised questions about the assessment indicators, or tools, for the Department of 
State where outputs, measured by funds , were enough, and where data was input into a report for 
Congress. Here, in OSD, they are looking for other indicators, which could even be perceptions 
of being more capable, beyond outputs of funds , i.e. outcomes. Their overall roles in this office, 
whose target is to be policy in DoD are as follows: Guidance, in order to coordinate all of the 
elements involved in these issues; resources; and authorities, as necessary in order to be able to 
implement programs. They noted many requests for change in authorities now. 
They did not offer any strong ideas about assessment tools and concepts. They discussed 
the politics of assessments and the general sense was that it comes out of a belief that getting 
resources is easier, is more certain, if there are assessments showing that there are results from 
the programs that are being assessed. 
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The U.S. Senate 
A meeting was then conducted with Tim Rieser, a senior staff member of the Senate 
Subcommittee for International Programs on the Appropriations Committee. He and his 
predecessor, Eric Newsome, created E-IMET, which he considers a misnomer in the sense in that 
it is actually more restricted than regular IMET; the emphasis, however, was to provide input on 
civil-military relations, military justice, human rights, and resource management in order to 
attempt to reform repressive militaries. Thus E-IMET is broader, or expanded, in another sense 
of more themes and priorities. Dr. Bruneau read him the objectives from the draft, and Mr. 
Rieser observed that these are what "the administration" asserts are the goals, and are being 
achieved. But beyond "asserting" (his words) there is never any proof that they are in fact _being 
achieved. IMET is a given as constituting a good "thing". 
Mr. Rieser expanded about his frustration on the lack of data, of evidence, or an 
assessment about the positive impact ofiMET. The discussion then focused on whether this also 
included E - IMET or not. The interviewer stated that it is graduate education, and mainly 
Masters' programs. But, the assessment would focus on graduate education within the US, with 
resultant exposure and thus should have the same sense as theE- IMET. 
Mr. Rieser stated that he assumed that a more professional military, exposed to the US, 
should be better in terms of human rights and the like. He has no antipathy towards IMET but he 
would like to see some kinds of assessment, on at least a level to which small USAID programs 
for school children are assessed. Presently, IMET is not subjected to any rigorous evaluation at 
all. 
For him, the objectives for IMET should be a professional, disciplined military focused 
on external defense as well as an ability to cooperate in joint peace operations. Such a 
professional military must recognize the authority of the civilian government, respect the rule of 
law, and know the appropriate place of the military in a democracy. And, it must be able to work 
with other militaries in responding to common threats. 
WWW.CClm.org 25 
Currently, approximately $88 million is budgeted for IMET each year without any 
rigorous evaluation. He thought this is very presumptuous of the administration. He stated the 
need "to be real about all of this"; to show that it can make a difference." The interviewer told 
him that our research would begin with graduate education to show we can be effectively 
measured. He wants to support IMET, but benefiting organizations and personnel must be 
willing to subject themselves to assessment. 
When asked about a document stating the goals of IMET, he stated that there are neither 
legislatively mandated goals nor assessment measures, i.e . no measures of effectiveness. In sum, 
he, and others, are philosophically in favor ofiMET, but have never seen any data nor heard 
anything but anecdotes on its value or importance. He keenly welcomes the effort to assess 
some part of it. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
Meetings were also held with Pete Cornell, Division Chief for Management at the 
Programs Directorate. He reviewed IMET, coming up at the end of the Cold War; it and security 
assistance in general were very generic and already a bit "stale" by the tum of the century. 
Then, with 9111 , the emphasis was clearly on "boots on the ground". So, the pendulum needs to 
move back, to at least the operational level, and here is where building partner capacity fits in. 
The emphasis, or concern here, should be on different aspects of "strategic communications" 
where we should be training the trainers, or educating the educators, whereby what they learn in 
the US or in our programs abroad are more widely disseminated with multiple impacts. 
Therefore, the real measure of impact would be if graduates go back to their countries, and e.g. a 
year later, a visible, measurable, impact can be perceived. That is, what is hoped for is a 
situation in which there is an impact which is translated to the country. It is important that we be 
able to demonstrate that the education or training somehow changed the participant, who then 
behaves differently. He offered as an example the Rose Revolution in Georgia which was 
bloodless, in large part because the Minister of Defense, on being told to put down the 
demonstrators, responded that militaries don't do that; and he had learned that at IMET training. 
Nobody was killed in the Rose Revolution. 
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The topic of assessments arose and Mr. Cornell said that until the last year or so nobody 
did them. They only provided anecdotes to Capitol Hill when asked to justify IMET. But, with 
pressure from Congress they set up a cell and have one person who now does that based upon 
inputs from the combatant command; however, he does not conduct the kind of assessment this 
project undertakes . 
Cornell discussed the three IMET objectives posited by the interviewer. He said that the 
interoperability was half of it; to be able to work with the US and coalition partners. Most of the 
rest of it is "apple pie" sorts ofthings. These were indeed the priorities in the early 1990s. Now, 
most countries know what they should be doing. If they don' t then it is an issue of political will. 
But, in some countries, such as Central Asia, the US wants access and no terrorist havens. So, it 
becomes a matter of balancing objectives. 
He discussed how the IMET allocations are decided. He indicated it begins with guidance 
to the ODCs, then to Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), then DoD, and then 
recommendations to DoS, the source of the funding. The point is, the IMET funds are spread 
very widely. In some measure it follows sales of equipment- as there is a need for training. And, 
there are serious restraints on capacity in terms of finite school- house capacity, limited 
absorptive capacity in country, lack of English language proficiency, and people who cannot be 
vetted. In short, there are real limits on how it can work. He emphasized that the US needs to 
use these funds strategically - where our interests meet those of the host nation. 
Dr. Bruneau then met with Kay Judkins who has long been the main proponent for IMET 
at DSCA. She noted that the regional centers do not get IMET as Capitol Hill has directed. The 
interviewer told Ms. Judkins what the CCMR assessment team had come up with as graduate 
education in IMET and she had no problem; that it is NPS et alia in its many manifestations. He 
also asked her about the objectives ofiMET, as in the CCMR's draft, and brought up the 
capacity building issue. She observed that it can be done through METs as in training the trainer. 
The IMET budget was discussed and Ms. Judkins went back to 1994 when it was cut by 
Congress (related to some kind of perceived DoD indefensible democracy- promotion program) 
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She noted that maybe this time a controversial program was 1206, but that is now apparently 
understood so IMET can increase. 
Among many valuable insights obtained from discussions at DSCA are as follows : The 
relationship of the three IMET objectives for the draft survey instrument and the addition of 
partner capacity building. And, maybe most important, agreement at DSCA, and elsewhere in 
the meetings in Washington, D.C., on what the CCMR IMET Assessment team had defined as 
IMET and graduate education. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF GOALS OF IMET 
Based upon the above information on legislative intent, DSCA policies, and current 
interpretations and priorities by the key officers involved, we can summarize the contemporary 
goals ofiMET in the following terms : 
• encouraging effective, positive defense relationships 
• promoting interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces 
• exposing foreign civilian and military officials to democratic values, positive civil -
military relations, military professionalism, and international norms of human rights. 
• building partner institutional capacity 
QUANTITATIVE DATA DISPLAY AND ANALYSIS 
Challenges in Measuring the Impact of IMET on Graduate Education 
Even more than other US Government programs, it is extremely difficult, for a number of 
reasons, to measure precisely the impact of the IMET program. If it were not difficult, the 
current study would likely not be the first ever comprehensive program assessment. The 
following list is not presented to justify less than convincing results, but to highlight in advance 
the real difficulty of assessing the impact of IMET. For this reason, the CCMR team utilized 
both quantitative and qualitative data in the analysis that follows. 
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First, MET is only one tool among many used by the U.S. in its efforts to promote 
American values and policies, build partnerships, influence foreign nations, and foster 
international cooperation. IMET is but one component of military assistance provided by the 
U.S. to allied and friendly nations. Military assistance is itselfbut one element of U.S. foreign 
assistance and foreign assistance is just one tool employed by the U.S. in its engagement efforts 
throughout the globe. Accordingly, nations which receive IMET funding are also likely to 
receive other sources of U.S . aid in the form of grants or loans. 
Second, many nations which promote education and training through the IMET program 
also purchase similar (or the same) courses using their own national funds. They may also send 
attendees to these courses using U.S. loaned funds through the Foreign Military Financing 
program. The IMET program budget is in many cases a tiny sliver of the much larger Foreign 
Military Sales or Foreign Military Financing budgets, and accordingly is likely to finance 
sending a relatively small number of participants to U.S. courses. 
Third, the IMET program does not exist in a vacuum. Many other nations, including 
Australia, Great Britain, India, France, Spain, Canada, China, Russia, Taiwan, and numerous 
others have similar military engagement programs. These nations may offer education and 
training to foreign militaries on a grant, loan, reduced funding or reciprocal basis. It is not 
uncommon for foreign military officers, particularly those in the middle or latter part of their 
careers, to have pursued education and training in more than one nation. 
Fourth, in addition to its diplomatic efforts, the U.S. has ties to countries throughout the 
world on a number of different levels. Nations interact with the U.S . in the political sphere, 
militarily, through trade and economic relations, through academic, scientific and technical 
exchanges, and in many other arenas. IMET is just one tiny component of the massive and 
complex interactions that occur between states on a regular basis. 
Fifth, another element that complicates any attempt at evaluation of the impact of the 
IME'L rogram is that several of the objectives of the IMET program are broad and far-reaching: 
effective and mutually beneficial relations, better understanding, improved resource 
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management, etc. None of these broad goals are achievable by one person alone, no matter how 
meaningful his or her IMET-funded experience. 
Sixth, the question of time further complicates IMET program evaluation. Since the 
IMET program seeks to promote overarching systemic goals as noted above, results are not 
likely to be seen immediately after IMET participation, but rather to develop over several years. 
Of course, over these many years, many other factors and dynamics are likely to intervene, 
making it even more difficult to "tease" out the precise impact ofiMET. It is also important to 
note that many of the officers and civilians educated or trained through IMET are in the early or 
middle part of their careers, and therefore are not likely to yet be in a position in which they are 
able to implement systemic change. The true impact of IMET is not likely to be apparent until 
many years after the IMET experience itself, as IMET participants' progress in their careers over 
years or decades. 
Seventh, the US government imposed sanctions on countries which had signed up to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and ratified it, but had not signed an Article 98 waiver to 
exempt US personnel from prosecution in the ICC. (CRS Article 98 Agreements and Sanctions 
on U.S . Foreign Aid to Latin America RL33337) This resulted in all security assistance, 
including IMET, being cut off between 2004 and 2007, for twelve of 32 countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean for example. This represented a loss of at least three cohorts of 
potential IMET students. The vacuum that was created in the absence of iMET, and other funds, 
was in many cases filled by other countries as noted in point three above. The cut off of IMET 
directly impacted our assessment in the important cases of long - term relationships through 
graduate education in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and South Africa. Despite our efforts, in none of 
those countries could we do our planned assessments as the IMET program had simply lost 
momentum and the obstacles to collecting useful data could not be overcome. Furthermore, 
when IMET was reinstituted, in many cases countries received much less than they had 
previously been allocated. Ecuador, for example, received only $178,000 in FY 08 whereas prior 
to the cut off it received on average $650,000 per year. The FY 09 proposal for Ecuador is 
$230,000. With such small sums it is extremely difficult to identify, let alone measure, an 
impact. 
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Eighth, IMET is a Department of State funded program, administered and managed by 
the Department of Defense. Further, in-country, while the IMET program is managed by the 
Office of Defense Cooperation, or equivalent, which is responsible to the Regional Combatant 
Commander, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible for all U.S. Government programs in that 
country. There are, in short, many different levels of responsibility for the IMET program which 
make coordination a challenge. 
The combination of these eight elements make it exceedingly challenging to trace a 
particular policy decision, government action, or even shift in an individual's attitude or opinion 
to IMET alone. Events, processes or factors other than IMET may be the cause, or partial cause, 
of the observed outcome, whether the outcome is changed behavior or values on an individual 
level or change on a grander scale. 
Even with all of these caveats, we believe the combination of the quantitative and 
qualitative data analyzed in the following sections provides valuable insight into the impact of 
IMET on graduate education. We provide here more focused and comprehensive data about 
IMET than was ever before collected and analyzed. 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DATA 
This portion of the research report focuses primarily on the quantitative results obtained 
through the written IMET graduate surveys and the qualitative data, and its analysis. The 
qualitative data was gathered by the researchers through the stakeholder interviews with IMET 
graduates, senior-level host country personnel, and USG personnel, including FSNs. 
Quantitative Data: Discussion and Analysis 
One hundred and six written graduate surveys were personally administered by the 
research team to IMET participants in the 1 7 countries previously listed. The data gathered in 
the surveys was collated and processed, and quantitative results for the most relevant questions 
are displayed in this section. 
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The first grouping of questions focused on improved resource management and 
maximized effectiveness, as well as exposure to democratic values, by asking IMET graduates to 
consider three key indicators that may have been affected by their participation in IMET: 
• Knowledge within the participant's specialty or task 
• Knowledge outside the participant ' s specialty or task 
• Knowledge of U.S. systems and practices 
Participants were asked to rate, on a scale of one to five, any change in these areas 








Neither increased nor decreased 
Somewhat increased 
Significantly increased 
For these three questions, the responses were remarkably positive. 
• 94% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat 
increased their knowledge within their specialty. 
• 88% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat 
increased their knowledge outside of their specialty. 
• 95% of respondents reported increased knowledge of U. S. systems and practices. 
The question addressing the knowledge of U.S. systems and practices is important for 
several reasons. First, the U.S. has a vibrant liberal democratic system, and promotion of U.S . 
ideals and values is an important component of the IMET program. As noted previously, many 
international IMET participants are also offered the opportunity to participate in programs 
designed especially to promote these values. Second, improved knowledge of U.S. systems and 
practices by military and civilian personnel in allied and friendly nations is likely to facilitate 
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cooperation and interoperability with U.S. or other coalition forces, including NATO or U.N. 
peacekeeping forces. Finally, improved familiarity with U.S. systems and practices arguably 
facilitates greater reciprocal understanding. 
The next three questions addressed the impact of the IMET experience on organizations 
in the recipient country, as assessed by the IMET graduates. These questions also relate to the 
program's legislative objectives in the areas of improved resource management and maximized 
effectiveness as well as increasing partner capacity, in that many IMET courses are designed 
specifically to address these objectives. 
These questions, to which respondents could select yes or no, providing additional 
information as necessary, were: 
• After completion of IMET were you able to apply what you learned? 
• After completion ofiMET, were you able to influence others? 
• Can you attribute positive changes in your organization to what you learned through 
IMET, or as a result of your influence on others? 
Again, the results as reported by the participants were extremely positive: 
• 87% of respondents reported being able to apply what they learned through IMET upon 
completion of the experience. 13% reported being unable to apply this knowledge. 
• 90% reported being able to influence others upon completion of IMET, while 10% 
reported not being able to do so, or being unsure. 
• 79% of respondents attributed positive changes in their organization to their IMET 
experience or their influence on others. 19% reported no positive changes in their 
organization, and 2% were unsure. 
It is noteworthy that the weakest of these positive responses is that of positive change in 
organizations that may be attributed to IMET. Organizational or systemic change is the most 
difficult to create, for several reasons. First, many organizations, particularly military 
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organizations, are arguably structured in such a way as to be inherently resistant to change. 
Second, broad organizational or systemic change often takes place over time, in many cases over 
years or even decades, in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. Third, none of the 
broad objectives posited by the legislation or as interpreted by DSCA are achievable by a single 
person alone. It is only over time, and likely through the development of a cadre of officials, that 
the types of change envisioned in the legislation and program guidance will occur. Finally, as 
noted previously, many of the IMET participants are young or mid-career, and are not likely to 
yet be in a position in which they are able to themselves drive change. It was in recognition of 
this last factor that the question about IMET participants ' ability to influence others was included 
in the survey. 
The next significant question producing quantifiable results relates to the first legislative 
objective of the IMET program: to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and 
increased understanding between the U.S . and foreign countries. The question, to which 
respondents could select yes or no, providing additional explanation as necessary, was: 
• As a result of your IMET [experience], did your views and perceptions of the U.S. 
change? 
As reported by the survey respondents, IMET does have a substantial impact on views 
and perceptions by foreign officers and civilians of the U.S. 
• 84% of respondents reported that their views and perceptions of the U.S . did change; 
while 16% reported no change in their views and perceptions of the U.S . 
And, in examining the open- ended answers, virtually all of this knowledge was positive 
in the sense that they better understood the reality, vs. the fiction, of American society and 
government. 
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Next, survey respondents were asked to quantify the impact that IMET has had, from 
their perspective, on knowledge, attitudes and actions, on four different levels: the individual, 
the unit, the Armed Forces I Ministry of Defense, and the nation. 
The table below summarizes the responses to this question: 
Impact on knowledge 
Individual 
Unit 
Armed Forces I MoD 
Nation 
Impact on attitudes 
Individual 
Unit 
Anned Forces I MoD 
Nation 
Impact on actions 
Individual 
Unit 



































































As assessed by the IMET graduates, IMET greatly impacts program participants. 
According to the results of this survey, IMET has also very positively influenced IMET 
participants' units. The units constitute recent IMET graduates ' main sphere of influence and 
action. As noted in the data, the impact of IMET identified by IMET graduates tends to decline 
as the unit of measure broadens beyond the individual IMET participant. As IMET graduates 
progress in their careers, it is likely that their impact and !MET's impact on MOD and country 
will increase along with their own responsibilities and spheres of influence. 
In the following figures and charts these data are displayed in ways that graphically 
convey the results. 
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Here, with regard to impact in the MOD or the Joint Staff, the impact of the IMET 
program is less than the impact on individuals. During interviews, many IMET graduates 
expressed some frustration in their inability to influence immediate change within their 
respective organizations. The researchers note that most of the IMET graduates are mid level 
(and some junior level) officers and civilian equivalents; as a consequence, opportunities to 
shape and influence change often require "buy-in" from senior leadership . To this point, the 
benefits ofiMET cannot be easily quantified within some specific period of time, as it may be 
several years before an IMET graduate is in a position to make change. 
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The following figures and charts provide details about the data gathered. 
Survey 
Question 
number yes No Don't know 
11 Promotion 44 65 
14 Competitive selection 98 9 10 
18 applied what learned 102 12 
19 influence others 104 10 I 
20 positive changes 89 21 2 
21 change US view/perception 106 17 
A=question number on the students survey 
B=question language 
Negative Slightly Negative Neutral Positive Very Positive 
Quest. # IMPACT I 2 3 4 5 
15 Knowledge with my specialty I 7 41 68 
16 Outside specialty knowledge 1 13 46 56 
17 Knowledge US system I 5 41 68 
22 !MET impact knowledge individual 22 93 
22 IMET impact knowledge unit 2 20 54 35 
22 IMET impact knowledge MOD 2 3 32 49 24 
22 !MET impact knowledge Country 2 8 32 42 21 
22 IMET attitudes individual 9 36 68 
22 IMET attitudes unit 4 27 54 25 
22 !MET attitudes MOD or joint staff 2 6 39 43 20 
22 !MET attitudes Country 2 11 46 36 19 
22 !MET actions individual 8 44 63 
22 !MET actions unit 2 2 31 54 21 
22 !MET actions MOD 3 7 38 43 20 
22 !MET actions country 5 7 48 31 13 
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The following two figures illustrate the same data using bar graphs. 
IMET posit ive change 
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Competitive Selection Process: The competitive selection process was common among 
the countries visited; however nuances at the national level do result, to some extent, in final 
selection of candidates based upon differing relative order of importance criteria. For example, 
in some countries interviewees noted that language skills are often the governing criteria in 
candidate selection. Other countries stated that while language skills were important, a link to 
national level strategic goals and the need to improve skills in selected areas were more 
important than language. (So, for example, if two candidates had ECL scores of95 and 83 
respectively and the strategic goals of the nation linked closely to the need to improve the 
knowledge of the 83 scoring candidate, that candidate would be selected. This is discussed 
further in the qualitative findings section of this report.) 
Competitive 
selection 
Quantitative Data: Observations 
We are encouraged that we find variations in the data from the impact at different levels . 
This indicates that there are real differences, i.e. respondents didn't simply indicate the same 
response for all questions. In addition, from our contacts with the respondents, we know they 
took this responsibility very seriously. What we find is very strong support for the goals of 
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IMET in terms of opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and actions of those who received IMET funding 
support in their graduate education in the US. This is very clear in terms of the personal and unit 
level. It diminishes somewhat when moving up the hierarchy. It is also quite impressive how 
positive the respondents are regarding what they learned in the US. 
Qualitative Data Discussion and Analysis 
Open - ended interviews and use of focus groups facilitated one-on-one understanding 
and clarification that goes beyond the boundaries of our formal survey instruments. Open ended 
interviews were conducted with SAOs and FSNs in country and senior Ministry of Defense and 
Armed Forces leadership. Focus group data collection technique was used to meet with groups 
ofiMET graduates in countries where this was possible. (Note: Geographic dispersion of 
graduates often makes it difficult to meet with a group of graduates . This was the case in several 
of the countries visited by the researchers.) 
At the beginning of each interview the goals of the IMET Assessment Project as well as 
the IMET goals and objectives were introduced. Interviewees expressed their views, perceptions, 
experiences and recommendations about IMET. 
While this assessment focuses specifically on graduate level education, the natural 
tendency of interviewees was to discuss IMET from a broader view. Allowing interviewees to 
express their views on related subjects facilitated the opportunity to get more responses to the 
direct questions of interest, namely graduate level education. Furthermore, additional 
information is useful, and in the opinion of the interviewers, enhances the value of the 
assessment work. 
Through the interview the researchers focused on 
1. Understanding how IMET experiences impacted the graduate at the personal and 
professional level; and 
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2. Understanding whether or not, and how, as a consequence ofiMET, the graduate was 
able to improve or influence improvement to existing resource management systems and 
civil-military relations. 
Although many interviewees had no hesitation in making a direct link between IMET and 
one or more stated benefits, it is difficult to support a general and direct correlation between 
IMET and a particular benefit since, as noted previously, many other variables may have 
contributed to the benefit. Additionally, the benefits ofiMET may not be realized for quite some 
time. For example, a mid-level officer may not have the opportunity to make changes until such 
time as he reaches general officer rank, something which can take years or decades. 
The interviews confirmed the quantitative results of the surveys. IMET produces a 
positive and identifiable impact both in the relations with U.S. and in the participant countries. 
There were no negative comments about IMET as a program. In fact, most interviewees 
advocated for IMET expansion, given its successes. Also, many USG personnel pointed to 
!MET's cost effectiveness as an important reason for supporting the expansion of the program. 
The interviewees identified several examples ofiMET's successes consistent with the 
goals of IMET as outlined above. Additionally, many requests and suggestions for IMET 
improvement and expansion were offered. Three benefits stood out to the IMET assessment 
team: 1) a strong positive awareness of the U.S. society- not only from a military perspective-
but also from a broad societal lens; 2) long standing ties that IMET graduates maintain with their 
U.S. colleagues; and 3) opportunity to learn colloquial English as opposed to "laboratory 
English". 
Common Findings Among Qualitative Data 
A common observation among interviewees in the countries visited was that IMET "fills 
the gap" between education and training at the national level and allied requirements . For 
countries with small IMET budgets, this is of particular importance. IMET sets a standard for 
both education and training- that countries strive to adopt and implement in country. BG Furlan, 
www .ccrnr.org 43 
Slovene Armed Forces, stated that his US Army War College experience forms the basis for all 
his decisions and implementations. 
Historically, some interviewees noted that initial IMET participation in courses was one 
of "passive acceptance" i.e. the country would accept whatever was being offered. This model 
has evolved to one in which countries are linking their IMET requirements to high priority 
international operational commitments, and national level operational and strategic goals. 
Throughout the selected countries, SAOs, FSNs, IMET graduates and senior MoD and 
AF leadership noted the following benefits of IMET: 
• IMET improves interoperabilitv. 
o This is evidenced by the strong positive feedback and numerous examples 
provided by IMET graduates and senior US and country leadership. Coalition 
operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, for example, were enhanced by the ability 
of participating nations to send IMET graduates who had a solid understanding of 
US objectives and tactics in operations. This was evidenced in a cohesive 
approach toward structured problem solving, as well as in the ability by IMET 
graduates to communicate using colloquial English. The ability of foreign 
officers to apply tactical and strategic ways of thinking consistent with US and 
NATO standards were lauded by both graduates and leaders as clear benefits of 
the IMET experience. Polish Vision 2030, Poland's vision for its armed forces is 
consistent with both US and NATO interoperability goals. (Note: approximately 
80% of the Polish navy was trained on Soviet ships.) LTC David R. Womack, 
Joint Training Officer, MAP Jordan notes that IMET has exposed Jordanian 
military to doctrine thus improving interoperability. 
o An understanding of military jargon was noted as a strong benefit ofiMET. This 
understanding facilitates improved communications among coalition units . 
Additionally, many of those interviewed at various organizational levels noted 
that IMET graduates are able to cross- pollinate knowledge of military jargon at 
both an inter - and intra - unit level, thus further enhancing communications. 
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o A shared knowledge base is developed through IMET participation, with many 
long-reaching benefits. In Malaysia, for example, senior military leadership 
report that a common foundation of knowledge exists among many senior officers 
due to their participation in IMET. This tendency to "talk in the same frequency" 
goes beyond jargon to include a shared comprehension of important concepts, 
relevant issues and best practices. 
o General Boli, Hungarian Defense Forces notes that IMET has proved most 
valuable in that it accelerated changes in thinking which were vital to preparing 
for NATO membership and coalition operations. As a result ofiMET, he states 
that the HDF was transformed into a real military-not just one "guarding the 
barracks" . (Note: Hungary's prior two CHoDs, were IMET trained.) BG Gyenes, 
HDF notes that the HDF organizational structure is closely aligned with that of 
NATO and the US . 
o From a technical perspective, many IMET graduates discussed their IMET 
experiences as of great benefit in learning, for e.g. army aviation techniques and 
use of equipment. This facilitates coalition operations. 
o Larger nations face a tension between the need for interoperability and cost 
effectiveness. Turkey, for example, has a large army and air force. Certain units 
are selected for coalition operations in Afghanistan. To maximize IMET benefit, 
Turkey is shifting toward a train the trainer program and the use of more 
advanced courses with the goal of better interoperability within cost constraints. 
• IMET course attendance is linked to promotion and career advancement. One of the 
clear advantages of IMET noted by graduates was the link to promotion and career 
advancement. This is evidenced as well by the quantitative data illustrated above. In 
Poland, for example, IMET directly affects promotion. General officers must attend the 
strategic leadership courses such as those offered at the Army War College and National 
Defense University. However, while IMET completion does not always guarantee a 
promotion, IMET graduates are viewed as more competitive for promotion and career 
advancement. For example, in Slovenia, to achieve two star status, the candidate must 
have completed a program in one of the US or UK senior staff colleges. In the 
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Malaysian Armed Forces, participation in IMET is seen as a "stepping stone for 
progress," with top performers frequently selected for participation in U.S . programs, 
while second tier individuals might instead be sent to pursue education or training in 
Australia or other nations. IMET officers are generally viewed as "fast lane" officers. 
• IMET has a cross fertilization, pollination effect. Once they return to their units, IMET 
graduates use what they have learned and also teach what they have learned to their 
colleagues, producing a multiplying effect. Ability to utilize comparative analysis 
techniques toward problem solving within headquarters and field operations is one of 
the benefits. For example, the Slovene army mirrored its field manuals to those of the 
US Army. A good technical example of "pollination" effect is within Slovenia. The US 
trained Slovenes in how to build and load pallets into C-17s so equipment could 
accompany troops to Afghanistan. The Slovenes in turn taught the Croats. Hungary 
has a strong "train the trainer" program. LTC Larry Kinde notes that HDF is a good 
example of the "pollination" effect in that the seeds of knowledge are dispersed at the 
unit level thus benefiting the unit as a whole. The Sergeant Major of the Hungarian 
Defense Force spent nineteen months in Iraq as a training advisor at the Iraq Military 
Academy and a subsequent twelve months conducting infantry training in a British led 
mission. Related to this benefit is the fact that a significant majority ofiMET graduates 
stay in contact with US and other international IMET colleagues . Interviews in 
Mongolia also validated IMET as an important tool with which nations learn capacity 
building, e.g. Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI). Graduates have 
returned to Mongolia and taught others. This "train the trainer" approach has also been 
employed in a number of other IMET benefiting nations, allowing these nations to 
further amplify the impact of the IMET funds that they receive. To maximize the return 
on investment, Turkey requires that four years be added to service time as compensation 
for attending a US graduate program. 
• IMET exposes participants to US teaching methodology which emphasizes analysis and 
problem-solving. Participants adopt US teaching tools in their own countries' military 
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education: seminars, active participation in the class, and employing a "hands on" and 
practical approach. 
o Leadership style has changed from a central planning, top down approach toward 
a more participative approach in which subordinates are consulted for input prior 
to decision making (BG Potasinski, Polish Armed Forces). The importance and 
benefit of planning was noted as an important 'take away" from the IMET 
experience of an overwhelming number of graduates. Without exception, IMET 
graduates lauded the US teaching methodology- noting the practical approach 
which blends open discussion, case studies and dialogue between student and 
professors. Many attribute their ability to critically think about difficult issues to 
this approach to teaching which encourages thinking (vs. rote memorization). 
Many IMET graduates in Turkey lauded the teaching methodology in graduate 
education in the US. Turkey places its IMET emphasis on post graduate level 
education. In 2007, 52% of its IMET budget was used for post graduate education 
in the US. Military leaders and IMET graduates in several nations also noted that 
participation in IMET often tends to have the effect of making graduates more 
likely to speak up at meetings and to make substantive contributions to the 
decision-making process. For example, in Malaysia the Director of Training for 
one branch of the anned forces reported that IMET students are recognized as 
having more exposure to new ideas and as a result are often the individuals who 
are selected to attend the most important meetings. 
• IMET improves management and decision making of participants, thereby increasing 
their military's effectiveness Many interviewees noted that decision making skills of 
IMET graduates was significantly enhanced. The exposure to international cooperation 
and knowledge and clarification of political and diplomatic issues were noted as 
significant benefits. !MET's educational focus on dealing with unplanned events was 
also lauded by many graduates. Specific comments were associated with exposure to 
mission analysis techniques and decision making in uncertainty. For example, BG 
Potasinski, Polish Armed Forces noted that his IMET education has enabled him to 
make supportable decisions- given different threats. The Polish MoD uses recent IMET 
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graduates who are back from Afghanistan as guest speakers in their courses . BG 
Gyenes, HDF has used his IMET experience as a tool with which to mentor 
subordinates. It has enabled him to institute "effective military decision making". 
Graduates interviewed in the Republic of the Philippines attribute effective resolution of 
their Y2K concerns/problems to information obtained by IMET graduates ofNDU. 
Colonel Butalio of the P AF noted that IMET provided numerous management tools . 
Graduates learn performance review techniques, accountability, output and outcome 
models- all of which he applies in his organization today. Those interviewed agreed 
that these models can be applied to tactical and strategic situations today. Slovenia uses 
the US Army evaluation methodology to determine if individuals/units are combat 
ready. The Czech Republic IMET graduates note that they still refer to literature from 
their graduate IMET courses, e.g. 'Making Hard Decisions". In 2004, the Chief of 
Operational Planning (in Sarajevo) used this literature to adopt a systematic approach 
toward problem solving. Colonel Josef Prochazka, Director, Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Czech Republic has used the IMET learned multi-decision criteria model for 
de-mining projects in Sarajevo. He states that a six month review showed that the use 
of the model (the only variable) improved the success of operation. He is preparing a 
strategic management course to teach others about its use. As a result of IMET, the 
Czech Armed Forces has also adopted a Planning, Programming and Budgeting system 
consistent with that used in the US. LTC Petrov, Ukrainian Army, a distinguished 
graduate of the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, US Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2007 states: "My IMET experience made me a military business man". 
• IMET exposes participants to the importance and benefits of civilian control of the 
military and a strong civil-military relationship at the institutional level Exposure to 
democratic values was lauded, by national leaders and IMET graduates, as a strong 
benefit ofiMET. Throughout the IMET focus group meetings, graduates echoed a 
strong level of exposure to civil-military relations at the international level. The 
opportunity to interact with peers from various countries provided rich opportunities to 
understand and to discuss complex civil-military issues that affect not only national 
level operations but international operations as well . For example, the military doctrine 
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adopted in 2006 by the Slovene Parliament, is based on the system in use in the US 
army. The adoption of"bottom up changes" is also perceived as a benefit ofiMET. 
However, as pointed out by BG Boli (HDF) bottom up and top down initiatives must be 
harmonized in order to balance top level support for change. (Note: This is confirmed in 
the quantitative survey responses to question 22.) 
• Many IMET participants supported their country's participation in US-led or other 
international operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and in some cases identified the 
causal factors to specifically include IMET. The then Mongolian Defense Attache in 
Washington, D.C., COL Jagaa Mendul stated that Mongolia would not have sent troops 
as part of the coalition in Iraq if two important generals had not attended IMET-
sponsored DRMI courses in Monterey. 
• IMET helps to improve English skills. English language skills are critical to successful 
communication in theater (combat operations, exercises, etc.) IMET helps graduates to 
work with English language documents thus improving communications. Across the 
spectrum of those interviewed, the opportunity to learn "colloquial" English was viewed 
as a major benefit ofiMET. While labs were recognized as useful, graduates agreed 
that there is no substitute for the "US experience". The HDF noted that the phrase "I'm 
tied up" is not learned as a phrase meaning "I am busy". In operations, its use can cause 
significant miscommunication. They recounted a story of this related to coalition 
operations in Kosovo. 
• IMET promotes improved understanding of U.S. values and culture. Many IMET 
graduates pointed to this as a major benefit of their participation in the IMET program. 
For example, the Commandant of the Malaysian Armed Forces Defense College, 
FADM Tan Eng Seng, a distinguished graduate ofthe National Defense University, 
pointed out that "IMET enables me to correct the wrong perspective that people 
sometimes have of the U.S." Among USG personnel who work with the IMET 
program, it is common to hear that IMET provides an enormous return in terms of 
changing attitudes and perceptions of the U.S. In the view of one ODC Chief, IMET is 
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"the best money that we spend." Through IMET, "people are able to see firsthand what 
things are like in the U. S. and can make their own judgments. The U.S. does not have a 
great reputation with the man on the street, but the IMET grads that we have sent to the 
U.S. can come back and challenge those negative impressions- saying ' that ' s not true -
because I've been there and I've seen how things really are ."' IMET is considered a 
very inexpensive way to put forth U.S . foreign policy goals. This key point came 
through as well in the Latin American interviews. 
• IMET promotes building partner institutional capacity. While obviously subsumed 
within several of the categories listed above, many of the interviewees highlighted the 
direct impact of increased institutional capacity arising from IMET. In Mongolia IMET 
training led to UN roles in Sierra Leone and supported defense reform, and in El 
Salvador aided their ability to work with coalition forces in Iraq. Train the trainer 
programs are indicative of national level initiatives to develop institutional capacity. For 
example, in Indonesia, several IMET graduates reported sharing the knowledge and 
concepts that they learned through IMET with their colleagues in both formal and 
informal settings. In this way the effect of IMET may be multiplied many times over -
an approach that helps a nation like Indonesia, with 313,000 members in its armed 
forces, make the most of its IMET budget. Further examples of such programs are 
noted in several of the qualitative findings. 
OBSERVATIONS ON IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVENESS OF IMET 
In the process of conducting this study in the noted countries, as well as information 
gathered in countries where the questionnaires were not administered but where we conducted 
METs in 2007, a resounding echo was heard about areas of concern or impediments toward 
maximizing the positive impact ofiMET. Those that we heard most often are as follows : 
• IMET funding in many countries has not returned to its pre - ASP A sanction levels, nor 
has it kept the pace with inflation. Some countries receive so little IMET it causes much 
frustration in the ODC in its relations with the host nation. This situation is further 
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aggravated by the rising costs of airfares, lodging, etc. consuming a larger portion of the 
IMET budget. 
• Vetting is viewed as a significant procedural issue by everyone. SAOs and FSNs proffer 
that State is slow and inefficient in vetting, and has made some very serious and 
embarrassing mistakes. Many European countries expressed an interest in aligning the 
vetting process with that of NATO. 
• Some advanced special operations courses are currently closed to international students 
(But not the NPS Master's program). This slows down coalition operations as 
international team members are unaware of the protocols learned in that course. 
• In order to maximize the benefit ofiMET, graduates must be utilized in their field of 
expertise. This is not always the case, with some countries determining an IMET 
graduate's subsequent assignments on the basis of the IMET experience, while in others 
the graduate's participation in IMET may have little or no bearing on subsequent 
assignments. 
• A feedback loop that identifies issues/problems is needed in order to adopt a systemic 
improvement model. Feedback loops are a fundamental component of performance 
measurement and evaluation. 
• There is a perception among a few graduates from certain curricula that, for some 
courses, the "bar" is not as high for international students as for US students. They would 
like this clarified, and corrected, if indeed found to be true. 
• Too often, IMET graduates retire or leave before the benefits of strategic thinking are 
realized. While retention requirement policies/laws may be in place it is often easy to 
comply with the requirements while still retiring or resigning early. 
• Gaps in training are being filled by other countries, some of which are not particularly 
good models for democratic civil - military relations, and which are actively competing 
with the ·u .s. for influence. For example, China is trying to make headway in Hungary 
(as a gateway to EU and NATO) by inviting doctors to China to learn Chinese medical 
techniques. Cuba and Venezuela are very active in several countries in Latin America. 
• Additional funding for ODCs would enable ODCs to support IMET alumni social 
functions. This would be a means to ensure that IMET graduates throughout the 
www.ccmr.org 51 
military/defense force keep in contact. It would also help with Positions of Prominence 
Report. 
• Some countries are reluctant to provide data for the Positions of Prominence Report as 
they are unclear and/or suspicious regarding its purpose. 
• Consider a "professor exchange" program. 
• Many IMET graduates express frustration at their inability to immediately implement the 
best practices that they have learned about through their IMET participation, due to 
institutional or other constraints. Increased educational emphasis on the long road of 
change management may be a useful addition to selected IMET programs. 
• The late release of iMET funding is viewed as a major concern in all countries. Late 
funding exacerbates planning. For example, on August 19, 2007 Turkey received an 
additional $700K ofiMET. Pre-planning, was, at best, difficult. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Increase the IMET budget to the $100 million envisaged by SECSTA TE Powell 
While some countries appear to have enough funds to maintain a robust IMET program, 
others, e.g. those affected by the ASPA sanctions, receive such paltry sums that they are able to 
do almost nothing. If the appropriation were increased to at least the $1 00 million ( in year 2000 
constant dollars) envisaged by Secretary of State Powell, and the allocations increased for those 
nations receiving less than a minimum of $500,000, the benefits of IMET highlighted in this 
report could be more widely shared. 
Continuity, Timeliness and Predictability of IMET Funding 
One suggestion for improvement to the IMET program is to examine opportunities to 
increase the continuity, timeliness and predictability of IMET funding . It became clear in a most 
of the qualitative interviews that continuity and predictability are serious problems. IMET funds 
are authorized on an annual basis, and the eligibility of nations and the amount allocated to each 
are also determined annually. However, it is often the case, due to the failure of the legislative 
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and executive branches of the U.S. government to agree on the federal budget in a timely 
fashion, that the release of IMET funds does not take place until well after the beginning of the 
federal fiscal year (October 1). This causes problems on several levels. 
First, delays in funding impact the ability of countries to create reasonable and accurate 
spending plans for their IMET budgets. Without reasonable knowledge of when funds will be 
released, countries are reluctant to program courses that start in the first quarter (Oct- Dec) of 
the fiscal year. This has the effect of compressing the calendar, causing strain on resources and 
personnel during the remaining nine months of the year. 
Second, delays in funding also negatively impact IMET education and training providers. 
These providers face similarly strained resources during the latter part of the fiscal year in which 
most countries program their requirements. These providers also face hardship when courses 
must be delayed or cancelled altogether due to funding delays. This has a negative financial 
impact on the provider, and can cause significant budget and resource problems. 
Additionally, the uncertainty about when funds will be released each year has the 
tendency to generate disappointment when significant delays ensue, as is the case in the current 
fiscal year. The FY08 FOAA was not signed by President Bush until December 26, 2007, and 
by the end of January 2008 a substantial portion of the authorized IMET funding had yet to be 
released. This led to numerous course cancellations, and significant disappointment on the part 
of individual students, armed forces, ministries of defense, and recipient nations. When this 
happens repeatedly, as has been the trend in recent years, it can also have the effect of generating 
misunderstanding and mistrust, which is the opposite of the impact that IMET intends. 
Further, the unpredictability of funding levels from year to year makes long-range 
planning difficult. The amount allocated to individual countries can vary significantly from year 
to year. The amount allocated to each country is determined by the DoS and may be impacted 
by strategic and policy considerations as well as other factors. 
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To address these senous problems, it is recommended that Congress, DoS and DoD 
consider the possibility of authorizing IMET, determining eligibility and allocating funds on a 
biennial basis instead of an annual basis. This would extend the planning horizon for recipient 
countries as well as ODCs, facilitating improved planning and resource management. 
Additionally, it is recommended that all parties involved work to authorize and release the IMET 
funding in a timely fashion. Finally, it is recommended that the IMET budget and individual 
country IMET allocations be set at some minimum level, and also adjusted for increased costs 
(tuition, travel, per diem, etc.) on an annual or biennial basis. 
Clarification of Human Rights Vetting Procedures 
Another necessary improvement is the current vetting process of individuals who have 
been identified as potential IMET participants. Under the Leahy Amendment, funds authorized 
under the FOAA may not be provided to any unit in the face of "credible evidence that such unit 
has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary [of State] determines and 
reports to the committees on appropriations that the government of such country is taking 
effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice."20 
The vetting process is frustrating. Much confusion exists among ODC staff as to exactly 
how prospective IMET students are to be vetted. In recognition of the confusion and 
inconsistency with which vetting procedures were being implemented in the field, the 
Department of State issued a guidance document containing specific, step-by-step instructions 
about vetting in May 2007. It is anticipated that this new guidance will help to clarify and make 
consistent the procedure from post to post, but it is also recommended that additional training be 
provided to ODC staff. Additionally, it is recommended that the vetting procedure be examined 
to determine whether any further simplification or streamlining of the process is possible. Many 
20 The legislation continues, "Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to withhold funds made 
available under this Act from any unit of the security forces of a foreign country not credibly alleged to be involved 
in gross violations of human rights; Provided further, That in the event funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to 
this section, the Secretary of State shall promptly notify the foreign government of the basis for such action and 
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effective measures to bring the 
responsible members of the security forces to justice." [Foreign Operations Appropriation Act for FY 2006 (P.L. 
109-1 02), section 551. Available from: http ://frwebgate.access .gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109 cong public laws&docid=f:publl 02.109 .pdf. ] 
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SAOs and FSNs suggested that vetting be handled by the U.S. Embassy rathc;r than being sent to 
Washington where there seems to be insufficient dedicated staff to handle the vetting process. 
It is further recommended that the vetting procedure be examined in order to determine 
whether the DoS I DoD vetting procedure may be aligned with NATO vetting procedures, and/or 
those for education and training sponsored by the COCOMs or the Counter Terrorism 
Fellowship Program. Such alignment would avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and could 
also serve to reduce confusion about proper procedure. Further, it is recommended that DoS 
consider issuing a blanket waiver for human rights abuse vetting in countries with no known 
history of human rights abuses . 
Clarification of Eligibilitv for IMET-Funded Education and Training 
Another suggestion for improvement is to clarify within all AORs the eligibility for 
participation in !MET-funded education and training to include members of domestic security 
organizations like civilian police forces , emergency responders, and others similar agencies. 
Currently, domestic security forces are not eligible for IMET training in most cases, and yet the 
changed security environment post-9/1 1 calls for increased cooperation across sectors, including 
military, intelligence, police, homeland security and emergency services, in order to address the 
threat of terrorism and other security concerns. While some programs have an expanded 
eligibility audience, many countries do not utilize IMET funding for education and training that 
collectively engages both military and civilian organizations It is recommended that DoS I DoD 
consider expanding eligibility to encompass these sectors. Such expansion would recognize the 
important role played by all of these sectors in combating terrorism. Providing the opportunity 
for individuals from these broader sectors to pursue relevant IMET-funded education and 
training would also facilitate increased cooperation, the development of relationships across 
these sectors, and the creation of national coalitions (whether formal or informal) to address 
terrorist threats. 
Additionally, the expansion of the audience for IMET funded courses would in turn 
broaden the base of knowledge of relevant concepts and best practices in IMET recipient 
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countries. Such a broadened base of shared knowledge could facilitate substantive change in 
resource management and other systems in IMET recipient countries. As one senior military 
official (and IMET graduate) in Malaysia, commented, "this would help me -so that I can get 
individuals from economic planning units and other ministries to buy in when I talk about best 
practices and concepts." 
Improved Efforts to Maintain Contact with Graduates post-IMET 
Another recommendation is to improve efforts, across IMET providers, and by ODCs, to 
maintain contact with graduates after the completion of their IMET experience. Numerous 
IMET graduates pointed to existing newsletters and websites as positive efforts made by some 
IMET providers to maintain this contact and keep IMET graduates informed about new 
developments in their field of study, as well as of accomplishments by graduates in their home 
country. However, these efforts vary significantly from schoolhouse to schoolhouse, as well as 
from country to country, and many graduates suggested that they would like to see even more 
follow-up, including the provision of papers and other updated, relevant resources, via continued 
access to school libraries and program websites . This is especially important in nations which 
have adopted a "train the trainer" approach, as the IMET graduates who are teaching concepts 
that they learned through IMET to their colleagues' desire access to the most updated 
information possible. The Regional International Outreach (RIO) system, when it is fully up and 
running, should address this issue. 
Additionally, it is recommended that a system be put into place to monitor post-IMET 
placement of program participants in a consistent manner across all IMET recipient countries. 
This would provide some insight as to whether recipient countries effectively utilize IMET 
graduates upon their completion of the program in order to make the most of the knowledge and 
skills obtained through their IMET participation. DSCA collects data from IMET recipient 
countries and reports on IMET graduates who have attained "positions of prominence," but the 
tracking over time of individual IMET graduates beyond those in positions of prominence varies 
significantly from country to country. Some ODCs maintain ongoing contact with many or most 
of their IMET graduates, while others may be in contact with only a small handful of graduates. 
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No systematic tracking of IMET graduate placement and career progress is conducted across all 
participating nations, and it is recommended that this be rectified/further examined. 
Institutionalized Exchange Between Foreign and U.S. Students 
Another suggestion for improvement of the IMET program is to implement, across 
education and training providers, more institutionalized ways for IMET students to engage in 
frank and meaningful exchanges with U.S. students. This recommendation arises directly from 
feedback provided by focus groups with IMET graduates that were conducted by one researcher 
in Morocco, Indonesia and Malaysia. IMET students appreciate the opportunity to learn from 
their U.S . peers, but would also like to have greater opportunity to participate in information 
exchanges with them. Exchanges of culture, history, practices, knowledge, national and 
individual accomplishments and technical abilities would lead to even more increased mutual 
understanding between international officials and their U.S. counterparts, which is an important 
goal of the IMET program. It is recommended that the DoD issue guidance to education and 
training providers to urge them to consider institutionalizing such exchanges to the degree 
appropriate in their IMET courses. 
Development of a Systematic, Comprehensive Means of Program Evaluation 
The second most important recommendation of this report, after increasing the level of 
funding particularly in those countries still suffering from ASP A sanctions, is that the DoS and 
DoD develop and implement a comprehensive, ongoing program of evaluation of the IMET 
program. Such an evaluation would rectify the lack of systematic data about the IMET 
program' s impact and effectiveness that exists today. No standard evaluation format to assess 
the effectiveness of security assistance programs exists, which further complicates the task of 
designing any such program evaluation. These data can facilitate executive branch proponents to 
more readily justify the benefits they currently report to Congress. The current assessment effort 
being undertaken by DISAM examines one aspect of IMET- with its focus on output based 
measurements . As importantly, a comprehensive system of performance measurement and 
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evaluation that examines impact over the long term enables decision makers to do trend analyses 
in selected and important areas, e.g. effects ofiMET on interoperability. 
It is suggested that a system be developed to monitor, on an ongoing basis, the IMET 
program's performance. While there is no single correct approach to evaluation of a program of 
this nature, it is recommended that any system of evaluation consider the following in its design: 
• The development of performance indicators or measures of effectiveness with clear 
linkages to the IMET program objectives. 
• The development of a baseline assessment of the relations and level of understanding 
between the U.S. and IMET recipient nations, resource management capabilities, and 
awareness of human rights and other related issues, and other indicators linked to !MET's 
legislative and programmatic objectives. The development of such a baseline would 
enable researchers to measure changes in these indicators over time. 
• The articulation of clear theories of how IMET may be expected to effect change, impact 
these indicators and attain its objectives. 
• The articulation of the desired results or "end-state" for each indicator. 
• The development of uniform pre- and post-IMET surveys to be used across all !MET-
funded courses. Such a survey would enable researchers to capture at least some of the 
impact that IMET has on changes in knowledge and attitudes as a result of IMET 
participation. As the benefits of IMET are not often realized immediately or in the short 
term, surveys need to be administered over the near and long term. 
• The application of surveys and other data collection instruments at regular intervals after 
the intervention (the completion of the IMET experience). This would enable researchers 
to capture at least some of the effects that IMET has over time, and as officers and 
civilians progress in their careers. 
• The inclusion of input from both IMET participants and non IMET participants (such 
CTFP). This would provide insight into whether changed ideas, opinions, attitudes; 
practices are more likely to be observed in IMET participants than in non-IMET 
participants, including those individuals who have pursued education and training in 
other countries (e .g. Australia, UK). 
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• The inclusion ofboth IMET program stakeholders and non-stakeholders, including critics 
of the program. 
• A comprehension of the difficulty inherent in any attempt to establish causation and fully 
isolate the program's impact. 
Transparency and inclusiveness are also key factors to consider in the design of the 
evaluation.2 1 The development of an ongoing, comprehensive program of evaluation for IMET 
will require significant effort and resources . It is important to emphasize that this is not intended 
to be an exhaustive list of all factors that must be considered in the development of such a 
program. Rather, this section simply provides a starting point for further study and discussion. 
2 1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, Guidance on 
Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Working Draft for Application Period):22. Accessed 
February 25 , 2008; available from 
http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834Jr 21571361 21570391 39774574 1 1 1 l,OO.pdf. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING (IMET) ON GRADUATE EDUCATION 
Background: The three key objectives of the IMET program since the early 1990s are the 
following: 
• encouraging effective, positive defense relationships 
• promoting interoperability with U. S. and coalition forces 
• exposing foreign civilian and military officials to democratic values, positive civil -
military relations, military professionalism, and international norms of human rights . 
The Center for Civil - Military Relations (CCMR) has received support from Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency to assess the impact of IMET on graduate education. For the purposes of 
this assessment, graduate education signifies the programs offered at the Naval 
Postgraduate School that includes the Masters Degree programs and those offered by 
CCMR, including International Defense Acquisition Resource Management (IDARM) 
Program, and the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI). As indicated by 
program titles, a focus on resource management is an important characteristic of IMET education 
and training. 
Instructions: You can assist us in assessing the effectiveness of the IMET program, training and 
education by completing the following survey: 
A. The following infonnation is about you: (Note: Your name is not requested or required.) 
l.Country __________________________________ __ 
2. Branch of Service/Ministry: 
a) at the time of selection:. _______________________________ _ 
b) at the present:. _ ____________________________________ _ 
3. Year and Program Title of most recent IMET Training/Education: 
4. Rank or position at time of selection: _ ______________________ _ 
5. Rank or position upon completion ofiMET Program Training or Education: 
6. Present Rank: 
-----------------------------------
7. Specialty at time ofiMET Program Training or Education selection: _ ____________ _ 
8. At this time, do you work in the same specialty? 
Yes No 
9. Age at time of most recent IMET Program Training or Education: _ __________ _ 
10. Gender: Male Female 
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11. Did you receive a promotion as a result ofiMET Program Training or Education completion? 
Yes No Don't Know 
If yes or no, briefly explain. _____ _____ ____ _ 
12. Upon completion ofiMET did you return to the same organization? 
Yes No 
Ifyes, in the same position? Yes _No_ 
If no, specify your new duty assignment ____________ _ 
Was the new assignment a promotion? Yes __ No __ 
Was the new assignment a result of !MET completion? 
Yes No Don't Know 
Comments : 
13. How many IMET experiences have you had? 
In the United States Outside the United States 
- --
Ifyou had more than one IMET, did one IMET lead to another? 
Yes No 
' 
14. Were you competitively selected to participate in IMET? 
Yes No Don't Know 
If yes, what was/were the factor(s) considered for selection for each IMET program? 
****************************************************************************** 
B. The following questions relate to the benefits you may have realized from your IMET 
expenence. 













15. My knowledge within my specialty or tasks. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Briefly explain. ____ ________________ _ 
16. My knowledge outside of my specialty or tasks. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Briefly explain. _ ___ ______ _ _ _ ______ ____ _ 
17. Knowledge of US systems and practices. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Briefly explain. _______________________ _ 
If 1-3, was the knowledge of the US systems and practices relevant to your country? 
18. After completion ofiMET, I was able to apply what I learned. 
Yes No 
---
Briefly explain. _____________________ _ 
19. Upon completion of the IMET, were you able to influence others? 
Yes No 
- - -
Ifyes, at what level? (Circle all that apply) 
Peers Superiors Subordinates 
Briefly explain. __________ _ _________ _ 
20. Can you attribute positive changes in your organization to what you learned through IMET 
or as a result of your influences on others? 
Yes No 
Briefly explain. _________ ___ ________ _ 
21. As a result of your IMET, did your views and perceptions of the United States change? Yes 
No 
- - -
Explain. __________________ ___ _ _ 
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22. Using the following chart, please provide your assessment of the impact ofiMET. 
Imgact of IMET on Different Levels 





Scale: 5 (high or positive)- 1 (low or negative) with 3 being neither positive nor negative 
impact. 
23. Overall, what did you find most useful about your IMET experience? 
24. Considering the changing global situation, what additions, deletions, and recommendations 
would you make to improve IMET programs? 
25. Additional Comments: 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS SURVEY 
www.ccmr.org 69 
APPENDIXB 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING (IMET) GRADUATE EDUCATION 
The three key objectives of the IMET program since the early 1990s are the following: 
o encouraging effective, positive defense relationships; 
o promoting interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces; and, 
o exposing foreign civilian and military officials to democratic values, positive civil -
military relations, military professionalism, and international norms of human 
rights. 
The Center for Civil - Military Relations (CCMR) has received support from Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency to assess the impact of IMET on graduate education. For the purposes of 
this assessment, graduate education signifies the programs offered at the Naval 
Postgraduate School that includes the Masters degree programs and those offered by 
CCMR, including International Defense Acquisition Resource Management (IDARM) 
Program, and the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI). As indicated by 
program titles, a focus on resource management is an important characteristic of IMET education 
and training. 
1. Background Factual Information: 
a. Has your country sent students to any of the graduate level programs indicated above 
from 1994 to 2004? If yes (please circle) , 




b. Could you briefly describe the process of selection and decision - making in both the 
programs to be utilized and the candidates? 
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c. How are the priorities determined in the use of your country's IMET in the ODC and in 
your Country's Government? 
ODC 
Country 
2. Please assess the impact of the use of IMET for graduate education on knowledge, attitudes 
and actions (see below table): 
Impact of IMET on Different Levels 





Scale: 1 -5 [1 = low I negative; 5 =high I positive} 
3. Does participation in one of these graduate level IMET courses lead to participation in 
another? 
If yes, please describe the progression: 
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4. Are there areas for improvement in terms of achieving the objectives of IMET in graduate 
education? 
5. Do you have suggestions for innovation, improvement, and/or new programs in the current, 
Post- 9/11, environment of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), Article 98, and competition in educational programs from such countries as 
China and France? Please indicate in terms of the following categories. 
a. Programs: 
b. Processes : 
c. Level and types of resources: 
Your Name: 
Country: 
How long in current position: 
Thank you for your participation. 
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